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Background: Obsessive beliefs account for substantial (but not all) obsessive-compulsive
(OC) symptoms. Intolerance of internal experiences (IIE), which encompasses the constructs
of experiential avoidance (EA) and distress tolerance (DT), refers to difficulty managing
unwanted thoughts, emotions, and other internal states, and might add to current explanatory
models. Although IIE appears to be conceptually relevant to obsessive-compulsive (OC)
symptoms, scant research has examined this relationship empirically. Aim: The present study
examined the relative contributions of EA and DT as predictors of OC symptom dimensions.
Method: A nonclinical sample (n = 496) completed self-report questionnaires measuring
general distress, EA, DT and OC symptom dimensions. Results: All variables of interest were
significantly (all ps  .001) correlated with one another, such that higher general distress,
higher EA, and lower DT were associated with greater OC symptom severity for all symptom
dimensions; however, only EA independently predicted obsessional symptoms, but not other
OC symptom dimensions. Conclusions: One’s willingness to endure (i.e. EA), rather than
their ability to tolerate (i.e. DT) unpleasant internal experiences best predicts obsessional
symptoms (i.e. obsessing) above and beyond general distress. Potential implications for
understanding, assessing, and treating OC symptoms are discussed.
Keywords: Obsessive-compulsive disorder, obsessions, experiential avoidance, distress
tolerance.
Introduction
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a heterogeneous psychological condition
characterized by distressing, unwanted, intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses (obsessions)
and behaviors performed to prevent feared consequences and/or reduce anxiety (e.g.
compulsive rituals). Although various conceptual models have been proposed to account
for the development and maintenance of OC symptoms (e.g. Salkovskis, 1999; Teasdale,
1974), research consistently provides support for the importance of maladaptive beliefs.
The Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG; 1997, 2001, 2003), for
example, highlighted several types of maladaptive beliefs, such as inflated estimates of
responsibility, over-importance of (and need to control) thoughts, overestimation of threat,
intolerance of uncertainty, and perfectionism. Accumulated research indicates that such
dysfunctional cognitions (i.e. “obsessive beliefs”) are associated with OC symptoms in
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clinical and nonclinical samples, with correlations ranging between .14 and .41 after
partialling out general distress (OCCWG, 2005; Wu and Carter, 2008). Nevertheless,
obsessive beliefs do not fully account for OC symptoms. Consequently, investigators have
begun to consider other psychological constructs that might also be associated with OC
symptoms and potentially add explanatory power to existing models; as is the focus of the
present study.
Broadly, the intolerance of internal experiences (IIE) refers to difficulty managing
unwanted thoughts, emotions, and other internal states, a difficulty that is often observed
among individuals with OCD (e.g. Forsyth, Eifert and Barrios, 2006; Robinson and Freeston,
2014; Twohig, 2009). IIE encompasses two phenomena: experiential avoidance (EA) and
distress tolerance (DT). EA refers to the unwillingness to experience unpleasant emotions,
thoughts or memories (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette and Strosahl, 1996).1 DT refers
to one’s capacity to endure aversive emotions that are experienced as unacceptable or
unmanageable (Leyro, Zvolensky and Bernstein, 2010). Despite their conceptual overlap, key
differences between these two constructs include the emphasis on being “willing and open”
to unwanted internal experiences (i.e. EA; “I am willing to think about what would happen if
my mom died in a car accident”) versus simply being “able to endure” them (i.e. DT; “I can
bear to think about my mom dying in a car accident”). Both EA and DT may play a role in the
maintenance of OC symptoms in that they each drive efforts to control obsessional anxiety
and unwanted thoughts (Robinson and Freeston, 2014), usually through the use of covert or
overt strategies (i.e. compulsive rituals). Although such rituals might temporarily reduce the
distress associated with obsessions, they paradoxically exacerbate OC symptoms in the long
term (e.g. Wetterneck, Steinberg and Hart, 2014).
Despite the apparent conceptual relevance of IIE to OC symptoms, there is a shortage of
empirical research on this topic; most attention has been focused on obsessive beliefs as
predictors of OC symptoms, and investigators have only recently begun to even consider
alternate empirical directions. To date, the findings from research on EA and DT with
respect to OC symptoms have been mixed, perhaps due to conceptual and methodological
differences across studies (e.g. use of different measures of EA), as well as differences
in data analytic approaches (e.g. using global versus dimensional OC symptom measures).
For instance, although Briggs and Price (2009) reported significant associations between
EA and both global OC symptoms and obsessive beliefs (e.g. inflated responsibility) in
their unselected sample, Abramowitz, Lackey and Wheaton (2009) found that EA did not
contribute significantly to the prediction of any OC symptom dimensions over and above
the contribution of general distress and obsessive beliefs in an analogue sample. Using an
outdated measure of EA (Bond et al., 2011; Wolgast, 2014), Manos and colleagues (2010)
replicated Abramowitz and colleagues’ findings while controlling for depression in a sample
of OCD patients.
Findings regarding the importance of DT to OC symptoms are also inconclusive. Although
Hezel, Riemann and McNally (2012) found that OCD patients had lower DT than nonclinical
individuals, the authors neither controlled for negative affect (which has been associated
with both DT and OCD symptoms; e.g. Ricciardi and McNally, 1995), nor examined the
1
“Psychological flexibility”, the converse of EA, is a term often used in the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
(ACT) literature
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differential relationship of DT to OC symptom domains (e.g. contamination, symmetry).
OCD is a heterogeneous condition, and it is possible that IIE is involved in some, but not
all, presentations of OC symptoms. To this end, in two studies with nonclinical individuals,
Cougle and colleagues (2011, 2012) found that lower DT was associated with obsessional
symptoms, but not with other sorts of compulsive behaviors (e.g. checking, washing).
Still, other investigations call into question the stability of the relationship between DT
and OC symptoms. For example, Macatee, Capron, Schmidt and Cougle (2013) found that
low DT was associated with greater severity of obsessions in both clinical and nonclinical
samples, but only in the context of greater life stress (i.e. life stressors moderated the DT–OC
symptom relationship). Finally, although Keough, Riccardi, Timpano, Mitchell and Schmidt
(2010) found that DT uniquely predicted multiple forms of anxiety (i.e. worry, social anxiety,
panic concerns, and OCD symptoms), this relationship was weakest among patients with OCD
relative to these other disorders. These mixed findings highlight the need for additional studies
elucidating the relation of DT (and IIE more broadly) to the various OC symptom domains to
advance this budding area of research.
Accordingly, the goal of the present study was to shed light on these relationships by
replicating and extending previous work. In particular, we sought to understand the relative
contributions of EA and DT in the prediction of OC symptom dimensions as no study has
yet examined the unique effects of these constructs. That is, no statistical model to date has
simultaneously accounted for both EA and DT in the prediction of the various dimensions
of OC symptoms. Considering their theoretical relatedness and potential relevance to the
etiology and treatment of OCD (Leyro et al., 2010; Robinson and Freeston, 2014), elucidating
these relationships may help researchers prioritize indices of IIE when conceptualizing,
assessing, and treating OCD. On the basis of existing theory and research, we hypothesized
that IIE (i.e. both EA and DT) would predict both obsessions and neutralizing OC symptoms
even after accounting for general distress.
Method
Participants
We tested our hypotheses using an unselected sample given the continuous (i.e. dimensional)
expression of EA (e.g. Chawla and Ostafin, 2007), DT (Bernstein, Zvolensky, Vujanovic
and Moos, 2009), and OC symptomatology (e.g. Rachman and de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis
and Harrison, 1984) across clinical and non-clinical individuals, along with the costs (both
financial and temporal) of recruiting clinical samples large enough for meaningful tests of our
hypotheses. Research also indicates that associations between most OC-related phenomena
are constant across clinical and nonclinical samples given that the main differences between
such samples are quantitative, rather than qualitative (e.g. Abramowitz et al., 2014).
Our final sample included 496 undergraduate psychology students at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) who participated in this study for course credit.
The sample was mostly female (n = 321; 64.6%) with a mean age of 19.10 years old (SD =
1.20, range 18 to 25). The majority of participants identified as white (n = 389; 74%), with
10% (n = 49) identifying as black, 9% (n = 45) identifying as Asian, 4% (n = 21) identifying
as Hispanic/Latino, and 2% (n = 12) identifying with another racial/ethnic group.
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Procedure
Participation was open to all undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology
courses. Upon electronically consenting to participate, respondents were directed to a survey
link hosted by Qualtrics, a secure online survey development tool. Participants completed the
measures described below in random order, followed by a demographics questionnaire. Two
distractor items (e.g. “please answer Always True for this item”) were also included among
the measures to increase the probability that only valid responses from attentive participants
would be included in analyses. This study was approved by the UNC-CH Institutional Review
Board.
Measures
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). The OCI-R is an 18-
item self-report measure of OC symptom severity. Participants rate the extent to which they
were distressed or bothered by 18 OC symptoms during the past month on a 0 (not at all)
to 4 (extremely) scale; higher scores indicate greater symptom severity. Items load onto six
subscales (five of which were used for the current study): washing, checking, obsessing,
neutralizing, and ordering. Because hoarding is no longer considered an OC symptom
(hoarding was reclassified as a separate disorder in DSM-5; APA, 2013), the hoarding subscale
was excluded from analyses. The complete version of the OCI-R has demonstrated good
internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent and divergent validity in previous
work. Internal consistencies for the assessed OCI-R scales ranged from good to excellent
(αcheck = .71; αorder = .86; αneut = .70; αwash = .78; αobsess = .82) in the current sample.
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns and Swinson,
1998). The DASS-21 is a short-form version of the 42-item DASS (Lovibond and Lovibond,
1995) that assesses subjective distress over the past week along three subscales: depression,
anxiety, and stress. Participants rate how each of the 21 statements (e.g. “I found it hard to
wind down”) applies to them on a 0 (rarely) to 4 (very much, or most of the time) scale; higher
scores indicate greater general distress. The DASS-21 has demonstrated good reliability and
construct validity in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Henry and Crawford, 2005; Page,
Hooke and Morrison, 2007). The DASS-21 showed excellent internal consistency (α = .90)
in the current sample.
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011). The AAQ-II is
a 7-item revision of the original 10-item AAQ (Bond et al., 2011). The scale assesses
psychological flexibility, which is the inverse of EA and is the core construct of the ACT
model of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2006). Participants rate their agreement with each
of the 7 statements (e.g. “I’m afraid of my feelings”) on a 1 (never true) to 7 (always true)
scale; higher scores indicate lesser psychological flexibility (i.e. more EA and pathology).
The AAQ-II has been shown to have a single factor and has demonstrated good psychometric
properties as well as convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity in previous work. The
AAQ-II showed excellent internal consistency (α = .92) in the current sample.
Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS; Simons and Gaher, 2005). The DTS is a 15-item measure
of one’s ability to withstand aversive psychological states. Participants rate the extent to which
they agree with each statement (e.g. “Feeling distressed or upset is unbearable to me”) on a 1
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
M (SD) Min Max Skew Kurtosis
OCI-R
Checking 1.85 (2.15) 0 12 1.93 4.53
Ordering 3.12 (2.86) 0 12 1.00 0.50
Neutralizing 1.26 (2.01) 0 12 2.15 5.22
Washing 1.44 (2.23) 0 12 2.08 4.58
Obsessing 2.00 (2.37) 0 11 1.40 1.58
DASS-21 11.94 (8.82) 0 48 1.17 1.36
AAQ-II 17.42 (8.42) 7 49 0.81 0.17
DTS 52.42 (11.99) 18 75 − 0.49 − 0.19
Notes: OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised; DASS-21 = Depres-
sion Anxiety Stress Scales-21; AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II;
DTS = Distress Tolerance Scale
(strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) scale; higher scores indicate greater distress tolerance
(less pathology). The DTS has demonstrated good internal consistency, test-retest reliability,
and discriminant validity in previous work. The DTS showed excellent internal consistency
(α = .92) in the current sample.
Results
Data screening
Of the 497 participants who completed the survey, one did not pass both distractor items and
was consequently excluded from further data analysis, bringing the final sample size to 496.
Data were then screened to assess concordance with statistical assumptions. No univariate
outliers were detected and the distributions of scores on all of the study measures were free
of significant skew (all values <3). Some positive kurtosis was observed in the data (kurtosis
values for the OCI-R checking, neutralizing, and washing subscales ranged 4.5 to 5.2; see
Table 1); however, these values were only slightly higher than the ideal kurtosis absolute value
limit of 4, and Kline (2005) has argued that detrimental effects of positive kurtosis values up
to 10 are negligible at N  100. Consequently, to retain interpretive value, we elected not to
apply a transformation to the data before conducting the analyses reported below.
Descriptive statistics for all study variables are shown in Table 1. In general, mean scores
fell within the expected range for nonclinical samples. As can also be seen, ordering OC
symptoms appeared to be the most common, followed by obsessional symptoms.
Zero-order correlations
Two-tailed zero-order correlations were conducted to examine the relationship between OC
symptom severity, general distress, EA, and DT. To control for multiple comparisons we
used a Bonferroni corrected critical α = .002 (.05/28). As seen in Table 2, all variables were
significantly (all ps  .001) correlated with one another (ranging in magnitude from −.50 to
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Table 2. Zero-order correlations between study measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OCI-R
1. Checking –
2. Ordering .52 –
3. Neutralizing .59 .50 –
4. Washing .48 .49 .46 –
5. Obsessing .47 .33 .40 .35 –
6. DASS-21 .37 .22 .27 .16 .48 –
7. AAQ-II .36 .22 .22 .19 .55 .60 –
8. DTS −.28 −.19 −.21 −.15 −.39 −.50 −.56
Notes: OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised; DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety
Stress Scales-21; AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; DTS = Distress Tolerance
Scale. All values significant at p  .001
.60), such that higher general distress, higher EA, and lower DT were associated with greater
OC symptom severity.
Simultaneous linear regression analyses
We conducted separate simultaneous linear regression analyses for each of the five OCI-
R subscales (checking, ordering, neutralizing, washing, and obsessing) and thus used a
Bonferroni corrected critical α = .01 (.05 / 5). Simultaneous linear regression models were
chosen over hierarchical models because we did not have a-priori hypotheses regarding the
change statistics of a model including AAQ-II and DTS scores relative to a model with only
DASS-21 scores as statistical predictors. Further, model statistics presented in a simultaneous
linear regression model are identical to those provided in the final step of a comprehensive
hierarchical regression model, justifying the use of a simultaneous regression approach.
Indices of multicollinearity were acceptable for all models (all tolerance values  .55 and
all VIF  1.83), suggesting a lack of redundancy in model predictors. Simultaneous linear
regression statistics for each of the five models are presented in Table 3.
Checking symptoms. The overall regression model was significant and accounted for
approximately 15.5% of variance in OCI-R checking scores, F(3, 465) = 29.01, p <
.001.DASS-21 scores significantly predicted checking symptoms above and beyond other
predictors, accounting for 4.7% of OCI-R checking scores. Neither AAQ-II nor DTS
significantly predicted checking, although there was a trend toward significance for AAQ-II
scores.
Ordering symptoms. The overall regression model was significant and accounted for
approximately 5.9% of variance in OCI-R ordering scores, F(3, 471) = 9.79, p < .001.
Neither DASS-21, AAQ-II, nor DTS significantly predicted ordering, although there was a
trend toward significance for DASS-21 scores.
Neutralizing symptoms. The overall regression model was significant and accounted for
approximately 7.8% of variance in OCI-R neutralizing scores, F(3, 473) = 13.26, p <
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Table 3. Simultaneous linear regressions predicting OC symptoms
B SEB β t p spr2
Checking symptoms
DASS-21 .06 .02 .26 4.87 < .001 .04
AAQ-II .04 .02 .14 2.46 .014 .01
DTS − .01 .02 − .05 − .90 .370 < .01
Ordering symptoms
DASS-21 .04 .02 .13 2.26 .024 .01
AAQ-II .03 .02 .09 1.44 .151 < .01
DTS − .02 .01 − .07 − 1.26 .207 < .01
Neutralizing symptoms
DASS-21 .05 .01 .24 4.17 < .001 .03
AAQ-II .00 .01 − .01 − .15 .878 < .01
DTS − .01 .01 − .08 − 1.43 .153 < .01
Washing symptoms
DASS-21 .02 .01 .07 1.23 .220 < .01
AAQ-II .03 .02 .10 1.59 .112 .01
DTS − .01 .01 − .05 − .97 .331 < .01
Obsessing symptoms
DASS-21 .06 .01 .23 4.81 < .001 .03
AAQ-II .10 .01 .37 7.22 < .001 .07
DTS − .01 .01 − .05 − 1.15 .251 < .01
Notes: DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21; AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire-II; DTS = Distress Tolerance Scale; spr2 = squared semipartial correlation.
Bolded text indicates statistical significance reached after applying Bonferroni corrections
controlling for multiple comparisons
.001. DASS-21 scores significantly predicted neutralizing symptoms above and beyond other
predictors, accounting for 3.8% of OCI-R neutralizing scores. Neither AAQ-II nor DTS
significantly predicted neutralizing.
Washing symptoms. The overall regression model was significant and accounted for
approximately 3.5% of variance in OCI-R washing scores, F(3, 476) = 5.79, p = .001. Neither
DASS-21, AAQ-II, nor DTS significantly predicted washing.
Obsessing symptoms. The overall regression model was significant and accounted for
approximately 33% of variance in OCI-R obsessing scores, F(3, 473) = 77.80, p <
.001. DASS-21 scores significantly predicted obsessing symptoms above and beyond other
predictors, accounting for 3.6% of OCI-R obsessing scores. AAQ-II scores also significantly
predicted obsessing symptoms above and beyond other predictors, accounting for 8.5% of
OCI-R obsessing scores. DTS did not significantly predict obsessing.
Discussion
Cognitive-behavioral models of OC symptoms have strong empirical support (e.g. Salkovskis,
1999). Nevertheless, obsessional beliefs only partially explain OC symptoms. Accordingly, it
is worthwhile to examine other phenomena of interest that seem conceptually relevant to OCD
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and that might enhance or inform existing theoretical models. The current study sought to
examine the unique contributions of EA and DT in the prediction of OC symptom dimensions.
The present work builds on previous studies that have examined these constructs separately
and is the first to simultaneously account for both IIE indices in the prediction of the various
OC symptom dimensions.
Overall, our results suggest significant – if modest – associations among OC symptoms,
EA, and DT in the expected directions, affirming the conceptual relatedness of these
constructs. Yet, it appears to be one’s willingness (i.e. psychological flexibility, EA)
rather than ability (i.e. distress tolerance, DT) to sustain unpleasant internal experiences
that best predicts obsessional symptoms above and beyond general distress. This finding
highlights the distinction between simply enduring aversive emotions (i.e. DT; “I can
tolerate being distressed or upset as well as most people”) versus being willing and open
to experiencing them (i.e. psychological flexibility; “It is okay if I remember something
unpleasant”). Acceptance involves welcoming unwanted obsessional thoughts, images, and
anxiety without attempting to change them versus simply tolerating them until they dissipate.
This distinction is noteworthy because researchers have recently cautioned that over-reliance
on fear reduction strategies (i.e. trying to eliminate unwanted internal experiences) may have
unintended negative consequences that inadvertently maintain OC symptoms; specifically,
individuals strive to control their anxiety rather than learning that anxiety itself is not
threatening (Abramowitz and Arch, 2014). Accordingly, based on the current findings and
their conceptual implications, researchers may wish to prioritize indices of EA (more so than
DT) when conceptualizing, assessing, and treating OC symptoms.
Second, integrating this result with previous work (Cougle et al., 2011, 2012), obsessions
may be the domain most robustly and consistently related to IIE. Indeed, obsessions often
involve thoughts with unpleasant, ego-dystonic content (e.g. violence, morality) that (a)
intrude frequently and abruptly into consciousness without identifiable evoking stimuli and (b)
are associated with subtle mental rituals and neutralizing behaviors (Lee and Kwon, 2003).
Given the relative ease and frequency with which mental rituals can be enacted, EA may
especially contribute to the maintenance of unacceptable obsessions (as opposed, for example,
to those pertaining to contamination or the need for exactness). Specifically, although our
findings are merely correlational, it may be that individuals with high EA engage in repeated
covert attempts to avoid or escape from frequent and unwanted internal experiences (i.e.
unacceptable obsessional thoughts). These responses, in turn, might serve to exacerbate the
obsessions, perhaps because the individual becomes hypervigilant for “bad thoughts” and
preoccupied with eliminating them completely. Future research is necessary to directly test
this possibility, however, especially in light of the fact that the OCI-R neutralizing scale used
in the present study assesses more numerical neutralizing (e.g. “I feel I have to repeat certain
numbers”) than other mental thought control strategies.
It is worth mentioning that our IIE predictors accounted for a modest proportion of
variance in OC symptom dimensions. Previous researchers have conjectured that the limited
explanatory power of measures such as the AAQ is due to the fact that EA and DT are
general measures of IIE (vs. other more disorder-specific constructs such as obsessive beliefs;
Abramowitz et al., 2009). Individuals may find it difficult to report avoidance of thoughts
and feelings considered generally (e.g. “Emotions cause problems in my life”), and may
find it easier to report that they avoid internal events that are specifically associated with
their condition of concern (e.g. “Unwanted intrusive thoughts cause problems in my life”).
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Accordingly, there have been an increasing number of versions of the AAQ that are being
tailored to specific anxiety disorders (e.g. social anxiety; MacKenzie and Kocovski, 2010). We
are currently developing a version of the AAQ tailored to OC symptoms that could advance
the study of IIE, as other context-specific versions of the AAQ have demonstrated incremental
validity over the general version of the AAQ (MacKenzie and Kocovski, 2010).
Along similar lines, future research on IIE would benefit from methodological
consistency since, as previously mentioned, extant research proposes various conceptual and
methodological differences that may account for mixed findings. First, the revised AAQ-
II (Bond et al., 2011) is a psychometrically improved version of the original AAQ that
demonstrates better psychometric consistency and should be prioritized over more traditional
but outdated versions of the measure (until a psychometrically sound measure of OC-related
EA becomes available). Second, given the heterogeneity of OC symptoms and findings
suggesting that IIE is involved in some (i.e. obsessions), but not all, presentations of OC
symptoms, researchers should utilize dimensional (versus global) OC symptom measures to
capture the varying relationships between IIE and these symptom presentations. Finally, it
is important that further work on predictive models test the relative contributions of EA and
DT in predicting OC symptoms after accounting for obsessive beliefs, which have established
predictive power in accounting for such symptoms. Moreover, it is also important to control
for general negative affect considering that negative affect has been associated with DT, EA,
and OCD symptoms. Such inclusive predictive models will provide a more accurate estimate
of the explanatory power of IIE constructs.
To the extent that our non-clinical sample can be used to draw inferences about treatment-
seeking individuals, the current study suggests that targeting EA, in particular, may have
implications for the treatment of OCD. Acceptance-based approaches (e.g. ACT; Hayes,
Luoma, Bond, Masuda and Lillis, 2006; Hayes, Strosahl and Wilson, 1999) use experiential
metaphors to target EA in anxiety treatment, with preliminarily encouraging results (Twohig,
Hayes and Masuda, 2006), and with additional research underway examining how such
techniques might be integrated into established cognitive-behavioral interventions such as
exposure and response prevention (Twohig et al., in press).
Limitations
A number of limitations of the present study should be noted. First, our data were collected
using a non-clinical sample, which might not generalize to clinical samples. A recent
review of the analogue literature, however, underscores the qualitative (but not quantitative)
similarities between analogue and clinical OC symptoms (e.g. Abramowitz et al., 2014).
Future research on this topic with clinical samples is therefore encouraged. Second, the
reliance on self-report methodology might inflate associations among study measures, and
is therefore a limitation. Third, the correlational nature of the study design prevents drawing
causal conclusions. Although our findings are consistent with the theory that high levels of
EA contribute to the development and maintenance of obsessional symptoms, an alternate
explanation is that individuals with OCD develop maladaptive IIE difficulties as a result of
their struggle with unacceptable thoughts. Fourth, our sample was predominantly young and
white; therefore, we cannot speak to the generalizability of our findings to a population with
greater demographic diversity. Finally, the omission of measures assessing constructs such
as responsibility, thought-action fusion, and the need to control thoughts is a limitation in
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that it prevents conclusions regarding the relative explanatory power of IIE versus established
cognitive variables (i.e. “obsessive beliefs”). As this is a key limitation of our study, future
research should examine broader explanatory models incorporating both established and novel
constructs.
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